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In an oft-cited passage in The Varieties of Reference,1 Gareth Evans wrote that 
 
In making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, or 
occasionally literally, directed outward —upon the world. If someone asks me 
‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’ I must attend, in answering 
him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were 
answering the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’ I get myself in a 
position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting in to 
operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p. 
(Evans, 1982, p. 225) 
 
Evans’ suggestion is that, at least in a significant range of cases, a question about 
one’s doxastic state is, in a now widespread terminology, transparent to a 
question about the non-mental world: answer the latter to your satisfaction and 
you thereby answer the former. Indeed, not only can you answer the 
psychological question in this ‘outward-looking’ kind of way, but moreover, 
Evans seems to suggest, you must do so. 
 That last claim seems clearly wrong. If you are asked, ‘Do you think there 
is going to be a third world war?’, you might perfectly (self-) knowledgeably 
answer, without “directing your eyes outward”, that you have never thought 
about the matter and have no view. If, it may be said, Evans is right to suggest 
that, in a normal context, you would have to answer the ‘Do you think. . . ?’ 
question in the same way as would be appropriate for the ‘Will there be . . ?’ 
question, this is because in a normal context, there would be no interest in the 
distinction between the questions — the ‘Do you think . . .?’ question would not 
be heard as a psychological question at all.  
 It may be rejoined that Evans mis-stated a good point: that his crucial 
insight was not that one must answer the ‘Do you think . . .?’  question by 
addressing the worldly one, but that one can so answer the former, even when it 
is taken strictly psychologically.  You can settle a question about your mind by 
settling a question about non-mental reality. This ‘transparency’ thesis has been 
widely received as of fundamental importance for a satisfactory account of the 
 




apparent immediacy of much ordinary self-knowledge and of the special 
authority of first-person reports of attitudes and other states of mind.2  
Now it’s notable that there is no suggestion in Evans himself that this 
‘transparency thought’ even provides the key to a workable overall account of 
self-knowledge of belief in particular, still less that it provides a pointer towards 
a satisfactory general account of psychological self-knowledge of other attitudes, 
or of the wider field of psychological states tout court.3 In this trenchantly and 
engagingly written book (hereafter: TSK), however, Alex Byrne goes the whole 
hog, elaborating and defending a form of transparency theory of psychological 
self-knowledge for each of belief, perception and sensation, desire, intention, 
emotion, memory, imagination and thought. Specifically, he argues that for 
mental states and events of all these kinds, one comes to know that one is a 
particular such state by inference — as we shall say, a Byrnean inference —from 
a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in the state in 
question. Note that the ‘transparency’ entrained by such a view is really that of 
the non-mental environment: it is this that one supposedly ‘sees through’. Self-
knowledge is canonically achieved by inference from materials delivered by 
attention to a suitably corresponding tract of the non-mental world, not by any 
kind of direct scrutiny of what lies within the mind.  
 There are two immediate misgivings about this very striking project. 
First, any such account for a particular mental characteristic, M, must of course 
first propose some suitable tract of non-mental reality attention to which is to 
provide the basis for the relevant Byrnean inference to the obtaining of an 
instance of M. That one might accomplish this for the general run of mental 
states other than belief impresses as far-fetched. What, for example, is to be the 
worldly premise so corresponding to ‘I intend to do this’, or so corresponding to 
‘I am suffering a visual aurora’? Second, while belief is doubtless the most 
opportune case, where the relevant form of Byrnean inference can, as prefigured 
in Evans, simply be that from 'P' to 'I believe that P', and where someone who 
recognizes the premise as true and moves to the conclusion will, plausibly4 
conclude something true, the transition, as Byrne is only too well aware, qua 
inference, seems epistemically terrible:5 even the most unsophisticated self-
 
2 It is, for example, central in Richard Moran’s treatment of self-knowledge in his (2001), where 
the central contention is that questions about one’s attitudes are characteristically resolved by 
attending to what they ought to be, and in Jordi Fernandez’ (2013) which undertakes a 
systematic defense of the view that we attribute beliefs and desires to ourselves based on our 
grounds for those beliefs and desires. 
3 In Varieties, Evans does advocate an ‘outward-looking’ account of self-knowledge of one’s 
occurrent perceivings (see pp. 227-228), but, in introducing this account, he is careful to describe 
it as different from the one he proposed for self-knowledge of one’s beliefs (p. 226). The basic 
idea is that, in determining what he is perceiving, a subject will “[go] through exactly the same 
procedure as he would go through if he were trying to make a judgement about how it is at this 
place now, but excluding any knowledge he has of an extraneous kind” (p. 227).  
4 We say “plausibly” rather than “necessarily” because of the arguable additional dispositional 
strength of ‘X believes that P’ over ‘X judges that P’. Byrne, on the other hand, regards the 
inference as self-verifying and the truth of its conclusion as guaranteed. We’ll come back to this 
below. 




knower will surely be aware that the obtaining of the circumstance depicted by 
'P' is in general at best exiguous evidence that one believes that P.  
 In the later chapters of his book, Byrne cheerfully takes these challenges 
on. But first he offers the reader a systematic and clear overview of the state of 
the contemporary debate, as he sees it. In chapter 1, he presents the problem of 
self-knowledge as that of explaining the ‘privileged’ and ‘peculiar’ access we 
enjoy to our own mental states.6 Chapter 2 discusses inner sense accounts of this 
problem, corralling a series of objections to such accounts, responses to those 
objections, and residual difficulties that remain after these objections have been 
answered. Chapter 3 surveys three recent much-discussed alternative 
approaches due to Davidson (1984), Moran (2001) and Bar-On (2004), 
respectively, raising objections to each of them. Chapter 4 examines a problem 
for the transparency thought itself — what Byrne calls the ‘puzzle of 
transparency’. Chapter 5 offers a solution to the puzzle of transparency for belief. 
The remainder of the book proceeds to attempt to develop accounts of the 
general Byrnean-inferential form covering each of perception and sensation 
(chapter 6), desire, intention, and emotion (chapter 7), and memory, 
imagination, and thought (chapter 8). 
 Byrne explains that for each one of these cases he seeks an account that 
meets the following four constraints.  
 First, in contrast to the so-called Constitutivist proposals of Wright 
(1987), Bilgrami (2012), Coliva (2016; 2017) and others, a satisfactory account 
must be uniformly detectivist. Byrne writes 
 
Detectivist accounts liken self-knowledge to ordinary empirical knowledge in 
the following two abstract respects. First, causal mechanisms play an essential 
role in the acquisition of such knowledge, linking one’s knowledge with its 
subject matter. Second, the known facts are not dependent in any exciting sense 
on the availability of methods for detecting them, or on the knowledge of them—
in particular, they could have obtained forever unknown. (TSK, p. 15) 
 
The states of affairs which psychological self-knowledge is characteristically 
about are thus to be conceived as self-standing, and in basic cases, independent 
of their recognition by the subject.  
 Second, as indicated, the accounts of the various kinds of self-knowledge 
addressed are to be uniformly inferentialist, with the direction of inference 
always from non-mental world to mind. 
 Third, a satisfactory account must be economical: the cognitive resources 
which it represents us as deploying in achieving routine self-knowledge of any of 
the relevant kinds should be restricted to capacities which are involved in the 
achievement of knowledge of other non-psychological kinds. So, in particular, no 
special mechanisms whose distinguishing task it is to track the mental may be 
admissibly invoked. This repudiation differentiates Byrne’s account from the  
Monitoring Mechanism account of Nichols and Stich (2003), and Armstrong’s Self-
Scanning account (Armstrong 1968), both of which posit a special detective 
capacity supposedly exclusively deployed in the achievement of self-knowledge .  
 




 Fourth, the account is to explain both the relative epistemic security of 
beliefs about one's own mental states compared to that of one’s beliefs about 
others’ mental states —“privileged access” in Byrne’s interpretation of that 
phrase— as well as the fact —“peculiar access” is Byrne’s term — that one 
seemingly has a special first-personal way of knowing about one's own mental 
states which contrasts with the ways one can know about the mental states of 
others.  
Each of these constraints may be challenged. But in our view much 
previous work on self-knowledge has suffered from want of the kind of discipline 
they collectively exert. Should it prove impossible to satisfy them, the reasons 
why may be expected further to illuminate the philosophical subject matter. In 
the remainder of this review essay, we shall concentrate—partly for reasons of 
space, but also because, Byrne’s optimism and energetic efforts notwithstanding, 
there is no evident reason why a transparency account should be expected to 
succeed across the board,— on whether he manages to fashion a satisfactory 
account complying with all four of his constraints at least for the marquee, and 
perhaps most promising, case: that of belief.7 
 
II 
Here, exactly as the reader will expect, Byrne’s core contention is that our self-
knowledge — or at least, that part of it that impresses as manifesting privileged 
and peculiar access —is achieved by inference in accordance with the rule: 
 
BEL     If P, believe that you believe that P 
 
It is important to stress that Byrne’s claim is that we actually do follow this 
rule—an account is aimed at of how we do actually routinely know of our beliefs, 
(not a mere model of how we might.) 
There are three separable salient kinds of misgiving concerning this 
proposal. 
The first concerns the nature of the transitions across BEL that, in Byrne’s 
view, we habitually make and the epistemic standing of the results. If a thinker 
follows BEL as a rule of inference and forms thereby a true belief that she 
believes that P, what makes that belief knowledgeable? Byrne makes a case that 
the procedure is safe because self-verifying — indeed guaranteed of safety even if 
one botches the investigation and hasn’t really verified P at all.8 However, safety 
 
7 The Appendix to this essay offers some reflections on some of the details of his more general 
project, case by case. 
8 See TSK, pp. 109-112. In Byrne’s terminology, BEL is self-verifying because “if it is followed, then 
the resulting second-order belief is true” (TSK, p. 104) and strongly self-verifying because “if one 
tries to follow it, one’s second-order belief is true.” (TSK, p. 107). The difference between 
following and trying to follow BEL lies in whether one’s ‘outward gaze’ delivers knowledge of the 
tract of non-mental reality on which it is directed: when one follows BEL, one forms the belief 
that one believes that P because one recognizes (hence, knows) that P (TSK, p. 101-102), whereas 
when one tries to follow BEL, one forms the belief that one believes that P because one believes 




is not, plausibly, sufficient for knowledge, at least when the relevant belief is 
acquired by inference. A subject who arrives at a true belief by inference had 
better, if that belief is to count as knowledgeable, also be rational both in making 
and in accepting the conclusion of the inference — or at least not irrational. But 
must not the agent of a Byrnean inference across BEL be regarded as egregiously 
irrational if they are thereby led to base their acceptance of its conclusion on its 
premise? And while the nature of inference, qua inference, and of the basing 
relation are, to be sure, stubbornly unsettled topics in contemporary 
epistemology, it is very plausible that they belong together at least to the extent 
that inference, whatever else it might be, is essentially a movement of thought 
which, in cases when it transitions from a belief to a new belief, formed as a 
result of the inference itself, essentially initiates a basing relation between the 
former and the latter. 
If that is right and if knowledgeable belief, even if safely formed, cannot, 
qua knowledgeable, be belief held on the basis of irrelevant— ‘terrible’ or 
‘mad’— reasons, then there is a case for saying that beliefs arrived at by 
inference across BEL are not, as such, (self-) knowledge. That verdict, would, of 
course, completely deflate Byrne’s project. 
At this point, it may be wondered whether Byrne is not perhaps 
misplaying the hand that Evans has dealt him. Perhaps he undersells the real 
credentials of BEL by invoking the idea of inference at all. Might he instead have 
proposed, to better effect, that BEL and its kind encode not rules of inference but 
merely patterns of transition which we (unreflectively) conform to in forming 
beliefs about our own mental states?  Is there any advantage of the Byrne-
inferential account that would be jeopardized by such a shift? As the reader will 
speedily appreciate, Byrne’s explanations neither of privileged access (TSK pp. 
109-12) nor of peculiar access (TSK pp. 108-9 ) would need to proceed 
differently on such a proposal.9 Admittedly, Byrne seems heavily invested in a 
view of Byrnean transition that is flatly at odds with this.10 But does the best 
implementation of his basic Evansian idea require him to be so? 
 
9 Simply: that transitions in accordance with BEL are, if Byrne is right, strongly self-verifying 
suffices to ensure privileged access as he understands it, —that selves’ beliefs about their own 
beliefs are relatively epistemically secure compared to their beliefs about the beliefs of others,— 
while peculiar access is ensured by the point that transitions across BEL only work in general to 
secure true second-order beliefs in cases in which one self-applies the method. Nothing would be 
lost then, at least in those respects, if Byrne were to drop the notion of inference. The reader may 
further reflect that a denial that transitions in accordance with BEL should properly be accounted 
as inferences would surely be enforced if, with Paul Boghossian, it is accepted as constitutive of 
inference in cases where it is a movement from beliefs to new beliefs that the subject “take” the 
former to support the latter (Boghossian 2014), since no-one is going clear-headedly to take the 
premise for a Byrnean ‘inference’ across BEL to provide such support for the ‘conclusion’. 
10 He writes, for example, (at p. 101):  
 
So, what does it mean to say that Mrs. Hudson follows this rule on a particular occasion? 
Let us stipulate, not unnaturally, that she follows the rule just in case she believes that 
there is someone at the door because she recognizes that the doorbell is ringing. The 
‘because’ is intended to mark the kind of reason-giving causal connection that is often 





The trouble with this rescue is that it would arguably forfeit the 
constraint of Economy. For what could explain our conformity to such patterns 
of belief-formation but the operations of a special detective mechanism— 
something which, given e.g. the input of a cognitive state encompassing a 
subject’s recognition that P is true, would simply cause them to form the 
corresponding second-order belief? This need not be, to be sure, exactly the 
usual ‘special mechanism’ type of account, whereby it is the first-order state that 
is alleged to include causation of the corresponding second-order state in its 
essential functional role. But — whether or not one buys Byrne’s view of 
Economy as a general theoretical desideratum — this variant appeal to a special 
mechanism would certainly inherit the characteristic drawbacks of its more 
orthodox relative.11 
However, it may occur to a sympathetic reader that there is, perhaps no 
need for Byrne to run this risk. He has an intermediate option, so to say: that of 
representing BEL as more than a (sub-personal) pattern of brute transition but 
as less than a rule of inference. He can propose that its status is that of a rule (of 
belief-formation) which we follow, but not as a rule of inference. This strategy 
could still be economical: the epistemic capacities in which self-knowledge of 
belief would be grounded would be whatever would be involved in recognizing 
the truth of a (suitably non-mental) antecedent of BEL plus whatever is involved 
in following a general conditional rule. Provided that following BEL can be 
distanced from the idea of following a rule of inference, but is to be viewed, 
rather, as the following of another kind of belief-forming rule not beholden to the 
same epistemic standards as inference, Byrne could thereby finesse the concerns 
 
These remarks occur in the context of a specific toy epistemic rule DOORBELL (‘If the doorbell 
rings, believe that there is someone at the door’) but it is clear from his proposal that a 
connection with basing is to be a feature of Byrne’s conception of his epistemic rules in general. 
11  Byrne offers relatively little by way of explicit argumentation for the constraint of Economy, merely 
expressing a moderate skepticism about the extent to which philosophers are entitled to suggest 
un-economical accounts of privileged access. He writes that “there would appear to be little that 
the philosophical proponents of inner sense can contribute to our understanding of self-
knowledge beyond a few pages motivating their theory, and some general discussion of the 
epistemology of perception” (TSK, p. 115, fn. 17).  It seems to us that he undersells his case. At any 
rate, there are powerful reasons to abjure philosophical approaches to self-knowledge that postulate 
special detective mechanisms. What, after all, can a mere philosopher hope to contribute to the 
explanation of privileged and peculiar access? It cannot be determined from the armchair how 
privileged and peculiar self-knowledge is actually, as a matter of contingent empirical fact, so 
pervasively and apparently effortlessly achieved. What the philosopher can reasonably hope to 
do is to articulate one or more plausible models of how, as a hypothesis, it is achieved. But such a 
model, if it is not to seem entirely ad hoc, must necessarily proceed in terms of cognitive 
capacities which we already know we have and which impress as relatively well-understood. 
They will therefore perforce be capacities which we take to be exercised in other domains. 
Moreover, insofar as the kind of special mechanism in question is conceived of as involving a 
(sub-)personal-level 'scanning' process whereby the subject detects his or her own mental states, 
the resulting kind of account must, it would seem, leave room for the possibility of “brute” errors; 
that is, in Burge's terminology, a kind of "error that indicates no rational failure and no 
malfunction in the mistaken individual" (Burge, 1996, 101), —and so must confront strong 
arguments (Burge, op. cit.) that such errors seem not in general to be possible where self-





we registered about basing and irrational inference, while preserving Economy. 
He might add that the reliability of the transitions sanctioned by BEL is enough 
to guarantee the epistemic credentials of the products of BEL without it being 
considered as a rule of inference.   
 To stress, this is not Byrne’s view. But it too would have discomforts. One 
concern is that it is not clear what it would take for us to ‘follow’ a rule when the 
rule in question conditionally prescribes action which is beyond our voluntary 
control – as, arguably, in the case of forming a belief. It may be countered that 
this is a worry for the notion of epistemic rules per se, insofar as they purport to 
control belief-formation and revision, and hence is nothing new: that it was 
already a shadow over the Byrnean rules when conceived as originally by Byrne, 
as involving inference and basing, for then, too, the output is beyond voluntary 
control. But there is a strong reason why the concern may seem more pressing 
when, as on the ‘intermediate’ proposal, inference and basing are out of the 
picture. To see the point, consider the directive to a jury, ‘If on balance the 
evidence seems to you to be such as to clearly incriminate the defendant, then 
come to the opinion that they are guilty.’ It may be suggested that a rational 
agent intending to follow this rule, will encounter no analogue of the kind of 
potential lacuna which, by contrast, would enter into following of the rule, ‘If on 
balance the evidence seems to you to be such as to clearly incriminate the 
defendant, then return the verdict that they are guilty.’  Free agency is implicated 
in the following of the second. Despite the weight of the evidence, you might 
choose to conspire with the other jurors to acquit. But arguably free 
(intellectual) agency is not involved, for a rational subject, in following the first 
rule: in responding to an appreciation of the satisfaction of its antecedent in the 
way required by the first rule, one’s doxastic response to what one regards as the 
balance of evidence will, unless akratic, be delivered automatically. 
 In short: the whole idea that we do indeed routinely follow epistemic 
rules of belief-formation passes muster, unless one subscribes to a full-blown 
voluntarism about belief, only if an appreciation that their antecedent conditions 
obtain is such as normally to generate the type of belief in question in a rational 
subject without the need for any kind of supplementary volition. There is 
accordingly a doubt whether, if Byrnean rules were to be proposed as having the 
status postulated by the ‘intermediate’ suggestion—as non-inferential rules of 
belief-formation, demanding merely that when certain conditions obtain, one is 
to form a certain belief, albeit one on which those conditions need have no 
evidential bearing, —it would make good philosophical-psychological sense, to 
suppose one might be capable of following them at all.  
 And so each of three possible construals of Byrnean rules—as rules of 
inference, as patterns of brute transition, and as non-inferential rules of belief-




We announced three groups of misgivings concerning the prospects for a 
satisfactory epistemology of self-knowledge of belief based on BEL.  The second 
is a cluster of worries about the apparent limitations of the scope of BEL: about 
whether there is any clear prospect of accounting for the totality thereby of our 




attitudes. Even if it is granted that BEL is a second-order belief-determining rule 
that we often deploy, rationally arriving at knowledgeable beliefs thereby, it’s 
prima facie subject to at least three kinds of limitation which suggest it would be 
overly sanguine to expect that a comprehensive account of self-knowledge of 
doxastic states might be based upon it. 
First, there is arguably a difference between belief proper — a 
disposition-like state — and the episodic state of judging: that is, of coming to a 
view as a specific, datable event. The reliability of BEL for which Byrne argues 
properly pertains to the latter. But to judge that P in the latter sense is no 
guarantee that one acquires the relevant disposition. The judgement may not 
‘stick’. This point opens a lacuna between an episode of following BEL and the 
formation of an appropriate belief, dispositionally understood. 
Second, a common objection to transparency accounts of belief is that in a 
wide class of cases, if the question whether one believes that P is put, one finds 
one's mind already made up, without necessarily any recollection of how came to 
be so. There is no need in such a case to ‘direct one's eyes outwards’ in order to 
answer the question. One is nevertheless able accurately and authoritatively to 
report one’s belief, without any apparent reliance on reasons or interpretation.  
Byrne has responded to this concern in conversation12 by suggesting that, 
when one’s mind is already made up, one simply remembers that P —in the so-
termed semantic, rather than episodic sense of ‘remembers’, as in ‘X remembers 
the seven-times multiplication table’ or ‘X remembers that the French Revolution 
started in 1789’.13 So, such cases are still applications of BEL: it is just that the 
method of investigation called on for the relevant antecedent of the rule is that of 
an exercise of semantic memory. The transition is still from a (semantically 
remembered) worldly fact to a second-order belief.  
This response, it may be countered, will not cover all cases. Consider a 
subject’s neurotic, obsessional belief that there will indeed be a Third World 
War, or a mother’s conviction of the innocence of her son, caught red-handed 
stealing. In such cases there need have been no forgotten investigative process 
whose result is then semantically remembered. Indeed, there need have been no 
investigative process at all. Yet the groundless beliefs involved may still be 
reportable with the usual characteristic authority and immediacy.  
It may be replied that such cases are perfectly consistent with second-
order belief-formation via BEL. We ask the neurotic, ‘Do you believe that there 
will be a Third World War?’, he asks himself, ‘Will there be a Third World War?”’, 
answers in the affirmative, and, transitioning via BEL, reports that he does 
indeed have that belief. But this way with the objection is uneasy, since it plays 
down what was supposed to be the principal attraction of the whole 
transparency direction, namely that one settles a psychological question by 
attending to a non-psychological tract of reality. For what such tract exactly is 
the neurotic attending to? Sure, the bluff answer is available: ‘The matter of 
whether there will be a third world war’. But the truth is that what he is really 
attending to is his preformed opinion on the matter, and not on worldly matters 
 
12 In the book Byrne attributes this response to Moran (TSK p. 61), but the context seems to 
confirm that he means to endorse it. 




that bear on the truth of that opinion. So the suggestion that his original answer 
is delivered via an application of BEL is, in the intended spirit of the 
transparency thought, arguably a sham. 
Third, the upshot of an investigation whether P can be any of a whole 
plethora of doxastic attitudes besides formation of a belief that P (or for that 
matter a belief that not-P.) One may fail to come to a view, or indeed decide that 
there is no justifiably coming to any view, or arrive at the belief that P is on 
balance more probable than not but nevertheless withhold commitment to P,… 
or any of a number of other possible doxastic upshots. In all these cases one 
would be expected to be able to pronounce authoritatively about one's resultant 
attitude. Recognising that BEL gives us no grip on this capacity of nuanced 
second-order doxastic discrimination, Byrne moves (TSK pp. 118-121) to 
supplement his account with two additional epistemic rules:  
 
NOVIEW  If you are in a poor epistemic position as to whether P, believe 
that you do not believe that P. 
 
CONFIDENCE  If you believe that P, and your belief has high (low) 
epistemic credentials, believe that you believe that P with high (low) 
confidence. 
 
Clearly, ordinary subjects do not think of themselves as being in a “poor 
epistemic situation” or of their beliefs as having “high (low) epistemic 
credentials”, —these concepts are the stock-in-trade of epistemologists —but 
Byrne suggests that “these are just schematic terms, to be filled in with what may 
well be a grab-bag of cues and heuristics, varying from occasion to 
occasion”(TSK, p. 120). For example, my knowledge that I am in a poor epistemic 
situation as to whether it’s raining in New Delhi may be cashed out as knowledge 
that “I am currently nowhere near New Delhi, I have not read The Times of India 
today, or spoken by telephone with anyone living in New Delhi” (TSK, p. 118). 
The problem, though, is that, ‘cues’ of this sort provide, at best, defeasible 
evidence for the second-order beliefs they are meant, via inference across 
NOVIEW and CONFIDENCE, to support – so, unlike BEL, neither of those rules is 
guaranteed to generate true second-order beliefs.14 This means that, if Byrne’s 
proposal is correct, a belief that one believes that P and a belief that one doesn’t 
believe that P (or that one believes that P with high (low) confidence) will not, 
when formed in the normal way, enjoy the same degree of epistemic security – 
the latter will be radically less secure than the former. And that goes against 
what seems, at least initially, plausible: that self-knowledge of unbelief and of 
 
14 As Byrne himself acknowledges (TSK, p. 118), there is also the problem that one’s access to the 
relevant ‘cues’ is not particularly privileged: I may falsely believe that I am currently nowhere 
near New Delhi and that I have not read The Times of India today, or spoken by telephone with 
anyone living in New Delhi, in which case, following NOVIEW, I will form a false belief that I don’t 




how confident one is in a given proposition, is epistemically on all fours with 
self-knowledge of belief.15   
 
IV 
There is finally, if correct, a lethal objection to the entire approach. We do not 
actually follow BEL. Recall, as was emphasized earlier, that Byrne is aiming to 
give an account of the actual provenance of our self-knowledge. Now, we can be 
said to have a practice of following a conditional rule just to the extent that, 
provided the antecedent obtains, we make some significant effort to comply with 
the consequent, or at least regard ourselves as in some kind of default if we do 
not.  But we do nothing of the sort with BEL: each of us is content to put up with 
(the realization that there are) no end of cases where a proposition P is true, and 
yet we form no second-order belief. There are no end of true propositions about 
which we have no second-order beliefs, and have no concern whatever to arrive 
at any. 
 To be clear: this is not a matter of ‘clutter-avoidance’, in Harman’s (1986) 
sense of the term: the point is not that it would merely be impractical to ‘store’ 
all the beliefs that BEL would have us form, but that we are perfectly content to 
form infinitely fewer beliefs than – if we really had a practice of following BEL – 
we would be required to form. For example, Proxima Centauri either has more 
than two planets or it does not. If it does then, by BEL, we should form a belief 
that we believe that it does. Likewise if it does not, we should believe that we 
believe that. One way or the other then, if we are BEL-followers, there is a 
second-order belief we should have about the satellites of Proxima Centauri. But 
not only do we not have any such second-order belief: we think that, in our 
present evidential situation, we ought to believe neither hypothesis about 
Proxima Centauri, and hence, if we have managed our beliefs as we ought, are 
right to lack each of the second-order beliefs which compliance with BEL would, 
one way or the other, require.  
 Now, this is liable to seem a daft objection. Some readers may want to 
respond to it by suggesting that it simply perversely misconstrues the gist of 
BEL; specifically, that the rule is, in intended effect, that when enquiry leads you 
to the conclusion that P, believe that you believe that P.16 But any such 
refinement of the intent of BEL would obviously be completely antithetical to 
Byrne’s purpose, since recognition of when one's enquiry has led one to the 
conclusion that P will invariably incorporate in effect a substantial package of 
attitudinal self-knowledge, encompassing awareness of a range of collateral 
beliefs and of physical and/or intellectual actions one has performed. To arrive 
at a knowledgeable second-order belief in that way is to transition not from 
without but from within the domain of self-knowledge. So the suggestion 
compromises the basic pre-requisite for a Byrnean transition, viz. a premise or 
trigger proposition concerning non-mental reality.  
 
15 As we explain in the Appendix, Byrne’s account of self-knowledge of mental states other than 
belief predicts the same prima facie implausible disparity. The reader should be aware, though, 
that, at least in the case of NOVIEW, Byrne regards this as a welcome result (TSK, p. 118).   
16 Of course, to gloss the rule in this way is immediately in tension with the response, canvassed 




 Actually, we need a distinction here. It is opportune at this point to refine 
our understanding somewhat of the rules of engagement under which Byrne is 
or ought to be operating. It won't suffice for his purpose if the antecedent of a 
conditional Byrnean rule, proposed to be operative in our self-knowledge of a 
certain kind of mental state, merely overtly concerns only aspects of non-mental 
reality. The rule will be required to facilitate transitions from knowledge of those 
aspects to conclusions about one's mind. So if the accomplishment of the former 
knowledge essentially requires certain kinds of collateral self-knowledge of 
mental states and properties, the Byrnean account offered will carry the kind of 
reductive epistemic payload which transparency aims at only if any self-
knowledge essentially involved in achieving knowledge of the relevant 
antecedent, is independently accounted for.  
 Say that a Byrnean rule is illicitly demanding if it doesn’t meet this 
condition— if a necessary condition for the achievement of knowledge of its 
antecedent, even if no mention of anything overtly mental is contained therein, is 
that the agent has, or gets, certain kinds of psychological self-knowledge. Then if 
these include the very sub-species of self-knowledge supposedly being 
accounted for, the Byrnean account is tacitly circular. And if they include only 
other kinds of self-knowledge, then a properly reductive account of those has to 
be given before any claim can be sustained to have delivered a theory which does 
full justice to the intuitive idea that the world within is available to knowledge 
that draws only on an ‘outward gaze’. The objection, then, is that BEL, as ‘non-
perversely’ understood, is illicitly demanding.  
 It is important to see that this objection would not be addressed if instead 
of a conditional rule, it were proposed that the gist of BEL is better captured by 
something on the model of a natural deductive rule of proof: roughly, 
If you have arrived at a line, P, at which all assumptions have been 
discharged, you may infer the necessitation of P.  
Correspondingly, for BEL, Byrne could have proposed something like: the 
transition is acceptable from recognition that P to the claim that you believe that 
P.17 Well, to be sure: on this proposal, there would no longer be the worry that 
afflicted the conditional formulation of BEL, about our insouciant attitude to 
unheeded truths. But the evident continuing problem would be that in order to 
follow this new version of BEL in any particular case, you will need to keep track 
of your epistemic situation and achievements — everything involved in knowing 
whether you have recognized that P. Keeping track will once again implicate a 





All that said, it would be inappropriate to conclude on anything but a note of 
admiration for Byrne’s book, which is full of ingenious moves and proposals, 
interesting arguments and is written throughout with good humor and gusto. 
 
17 In “Introspection” (2005), Byrne is explicit about the epistemic rule BEL functioning like a 
proof rule rather than a rule of inference (see pp. 95-96). Indeed he also suggests the same on pp. 




The exploration and criticism of other contemporary views in the early chapters 
will be especially valuable for anyone wishing to teach or introduce themselves 
to the contemporary debates about self-knowledge. Moreover, when so much 
recent work on the philosophical problems posed by self-knowledge has 
preceded in a somewhat methodologically unselfconscious fashion, it is 
refreshing and helpful to encounter a systematic treatment which is rigorously 
disciplined in the fashion illustrated by Byrne’s deployment of his four 
overarching constraints— even if they may be controversial in detail. It merits 
acknowledgment, further, that the character of one’s self-knowledge of one’s 
attitudes — knowledge that in basic cases seems no less authoritative and 
immediate than basic self-knowledge in general yet is characteristically 
uninformed by any distinctive phenomenology — can seem especially 
mysterious. The great attraction of Evans’ ur-thought is its promise to dispel 
some of the mystery about this phenomenological 'blankness’ or apparent 
baselessness. Byrne’s development of Evans’ idea is, in our view, the most 
interesting and striking to date. But for all the considerable dialectical 
resourcefulness manifested in the details of his treatment, we do not, for the 
reasons outlined or prefigured in the preceding, think his project is or can be 
successful, even for the masthead case.18 
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including , Philip Ebert, Adrian Haddock, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins, 
Indrek Lobus, Alisa Mandrigin, Giacomo Melis, Alan Millar, Sonia Roca Royes, Sam Symons, Peter 
Sullivan, Joshua Thorpe , Xintong Wei, Mike Wheeler and the invaluable input and advice from 




Appendix: Byrnean Rules for mental states and characteristics other than Belief 
 
To extend his account of self-knowledge beyond the case of belief, Byrne invokes 
a variety of epistemic rules that share with BEL the general form:  
 
R     If conditions C obtain, believe that P, 
 
where P attributes some mental state to the subject. Our aim in this appendix is 
to provide a short synopsis of these rules and prefigure some of the problems we 
believe they raise. Some of the worries we canvassed above for BEL also, in our 
judgement, apply equally to the additional rules. For example, at least some of 
the rules require that the subject form beliefs based on ‘terrible’ reasons. And at 
least some of the rules are ones that we can’t be plausibly described as following. 
However, we will not press these worries further here.  
Let us begin with the case of visual perception. Byrne focuses on self-
knowledge that one is seeing an F – for example, self-knowledge that one is 
seeing a hawk. Obviously, it would be hopeless to suggest that one acquires such 
knowledge via a rule like:  
 
HAWK If there is a hawk over there, believe that you see a hawk 
 
Given Byrne’s understanding of what it is follow a rule (TSK, pp. 101-102), one 
follows HAWK on a particular occasion if and only if, on that occasion, one 
believes that one sees a hawk because one recognizes that there is a hawk over 
there. But a belief formed on such a basis would only sometimes be true: there 
are countless possible cases where one might recognize that there is a hawk over 
there without seeing any hawk (one might e.g. see a hawk’s nest and hear 
fluttering nearby or simply be told that there is a hawk over there).  
Byrne’s fix to this problem involves strengthening the antecedent of 
HAWK. Call a v-proposition any proposition that can constitute the content of a 
visual experience. Byrne suggests that the right rule will involve transition from 
recognizing the truth of a v-proposition concerning a thing that one takes to be a 
hawk to the belief that one sees a hawk. More generally, self-knowledge that one 
is seeing an F is to be explained in terms of the following of the schematic rule:  
 
SEE     If [ . . . x . . . ]V and x is an F, believe that you see an F  
 
We are instructed to think of the v-proposition that [ . . . x . . . ]V as describing a 
certain state of affairs “in the language of vision” (TSK, p. 140). Byrne’s idea is 
that because the language of vision is unwritten and unspoken, the only way in 
which one can bring oneself to recognize that a v-proposition about x is true is by 
having a veridical visual experience involving x. Thus, in all ordinary situations, 
following SEE will result in the formation of a true belief.  
 This proposal relies on several substantial assumptions. First, it assumes 
that visual experiences have conceptual content in the first place – the kind of 
content that one can believe as part of the process of drawing an inference – and 
that the kind of conceptual content visual experiences have is indicative of its 
provenance: whenever one believes such a content, one must be having a visual 




respectively. Second, since following SEE requires recognizing (hence, believing) 
that the condition specified in the antecedent of the rule is satisfied, following 
SEE requires believing the content of one’s visual experience. To rule out 
possible counterexamples to this requirement (most notably, cases of known 
illusion), Byrne endorses belief-dependence, the view that vision constitutively 
involves belief in the relevant v-proposition (TSK, p. 144). Finally, Byrne admits 
that, unlike BEL, SEE is only practically self-verifying, meaning that it generates 
true beliefs, not in all situations, but in all ordinary situations (TSK, p. 140). This 
commits him to the view that our epistemic access to our own perceptions is less 
secure than our epistemic access to our own beliefs. Call this view disparity.   
 Each of conceptualness, indicativeness, belief-dependence and disparity 
may be plausibly called into question. But even granting all these assumptions, a 
potential problem arises concerning the explanatoriness of Byrne’s proposal.  
Consider a belief generated by SEE. That belief wouldn’t be safe – hence, 
on Byrne’s account, it wouldn’t amount to knowledge – if the subject could easily 
have formed it falsely. In particular, the belief wouldn’t be safe if the subject 
could easily have formed it in a way based on recognizing the truth of some non-
visual proposition – for, in that case, there would be no guarantee that the 
subject is seeing anything at all. This means that Byrne’s account can only 
explain self-knowledge of perception on the assumption that the subject who 
follows SEE is reasonably good at telling the difference between its being the 
case that [ . . . x . . . ]V and its being the case that [ . . . x . . . ], where the latter 
proposition describes the same state of affairs as the former (or a state of affairs 
as similar to the former as is allowed by the difference between the two 
propositions) but not in the language of vision.  
The problem is that it’s hard to see how this ability – telling visual facts 
and propositions from their non-visual counterparts – can be justifiably 
described as the kind of outward-looking ability that one can expect to be 
invoked (and taken for granted) in the context of a ‘transparency’ account of self-
knowledge. It’s true that the v-proposition that [ . . . x . . . ]V concerns the outer 
world, not the subject. But how is one supposed to tell whether that proposition 
is true, rather than its non-visual analogue, if not by looking inward at whether 
it’s a proposition that constitutes the content of a visual experience one is 
having? 
Byrne’s account of self-knowledge of sensation, imagination, memory and 
occurrent thought has a similar shape – and is open to the same kind of 
objection.  
In the case of sensations of pain, Byrne’s account invokes p-propositions, 
propositions “concerning qualities of painful disturbances occurring in the 
bodies of animals” (TSK, p. 149). The suggestion is that, when one feels a pain, 
one is perceiving a bodily disturbance via a special kind of perception called 
‘nociception’.19 Since, in creatures like us, nociception happens to be “an 
exclusive conduit” (TSK, p. 150) for facts expressed by true p-propositions, 
believing one of these propositions is a guarantee that one is nocicepting, i.e. 
feeling a pain. This makes the following rule practically self-verifying:  
 
19 This has the implication that there can be illusions and hallucinations of pain. Byrne happily 





(PAIN)     If [ . . . x . . . ]P, believe that you feel a pain. 
 
Similarly, to explain self-knowledge of visual imaginings, Byrne assumes that 
“the content of visualizing is the same kind as the content of vision – albeit 
degraded and transformed in various ways” (TSK, p.188). Letting ‘« . . . x . . . »V’ 
schematically express a v--proposition, i.e. a degradation and transformation of a 
v-proposition, he suggests that one comes to know that one is imagining a duck 
via:  
 
(IMAG-DUCK) If « . . . x . . . »V and thatx is a duck, believe that you are imagining a 
duck 
 
Assuming further that (visual) episodic memory constitutively involves 
visualizing, Byrne explains self-knowledge of visual episodic memory in terms of 
epistemic rules like:  
 
(MEM-DUCK) If « . . . x . . . »V and a duck was thatx way, believe that you are 
recollecting a duck 
 
Finally, Byrne explains self-knowledge of occurrent thought about by invoking s--
propositions, the propositions of inner speech (which he suggests we can think of 
as degraded and transformed versions of the propositions of outer speech). 
Letting « . . . . . . »es schematically express some such proposition, the suggestion 
is that one comes to know that one is thinking about a certain object o by 
following:  
 
(THINK) If « . . . . . . »es and thate is about o, believe that you are thinking about o 
 
In each of the cases just mentioned, Byrne is committed to analogues of 
conceptualness, indicativeness, belief-dependence and disparity. Conceptualness 
is especially controversial in the case of pain – a mental state that, according to 
some, is not appropriately described as having content, whether conceptual or 
not. Belief-dependence is especially controversial in the case of memory and 
imagination: since, in believing the antecedents of rules like IMAG-DUCK and 
MEM-DUCK, one must believe the relevant v--propositions, and such propositions 
are taken to concern ‘shadowy, insubstantial, ghostly’ objects (TSK, p. 193), the 
claim that we follow those rules commits Byrne to saying that “people generally 
harbor harmless delusions about a shadowy world of images’” (ibid.). Finally, 
exclusivity is especially controversial in the case of inner speech – for one might 
have thought that the propositions which constitute the content of inner speech 
are the same as the propositions that constitute the content of belief.20  
 In addition, it is not obvious that the rules above can guarantee a robust 
form of privileged access. Take MEM-DUCK. Even in fairly ordinary situations, 
 
20 Since employing the demonstratives that occur in the antecedents of IMAG-DUCK, MEM-DUCK 
and THINK requires attention to what one is visualizing or uttering in inner speech, there’s also a 




one may recognize the truth of the antecedent of MEM-DUCK without 
recollecting any duck: for example, I may visualize my uncle’s duck cleaning its 
feathers a certain way and know (merely based on the fact that it’s statistically 
probable) that last month my uncle’s duck did clean its feathers that way, 
without it being true that I am recollecting my uncle’s duck. If I formed the belief 
that I am recollecting a duck by following MEM-DUCK, I would be liable to go 
wrong in many quite ordinary kinds of circumstance. 
Byrne’s account of emotion, desire and intention has a different shape – in 
these cases, the proposed inference isn’t ‘mad’ and the antecedent of the rule 
doesn’t involve sui generis propositions. Instead, the rules suggested are the 
following:   
 
INT If you will ϕ, believe you intend to ϕ 
DES If ϕing is a desirable option, believe that you want to ϕ 
DIS If x is disgusting, and produces disgust reactions in you, believe you 
feel disgust at x 
 
We cannot hope to do justice here to Byrne’s engaging discussion of these rules. 
But it is instructive to consider some of the salient difficulties they face.  
INT generates false beliefs in all cases where one recognizes that one will 
ϕ without intending to ϕ: for example, I may recognize that I will die, without 
intending to die. To address this problem, Byrne appeals to Anscombe’s idea that 
self-knowledge of one’s intention is arrived at ‘without observation’. Glossing 
‘knowledge without observation’ as ‘knowledge not resting on evidence’ he 
suggests that “one will not follow INT if one believes that one’s belief that one 
will ϕ rests on good evidence that one will ϕ’” (p. 171). But this means that, in 
order to decide whether to follow INT, one must know on what basis one holds 
the belief that one will ϕ – a kind of self-knowledge of which Byrne gives us no 
account in the book.21 The objection of illicit demandingness arises again. 
DES faces the familiar objection that we may desire things that are not 
desirable and fail to desire things that are desirable (cf. Cassam 2014, chapter 1).  
Byrne responds to this objection by claiming that “the relevant sense of 
‘desirable’ is easy to miss” (p. 166) and that DES can be defeated (specifically, 
“one will not follow DES and conclude that one wants to ϕ, if one believes that 
(a) one intends to ψ, (b) that ψing is incompatible with ϕing, and (c) that ψing is 
neither desirable nor all-things considered better than ϕing” (165)). These 
adjustments may succeed in blocking the objection, but they also make Byrne’s 
proposal less appealing than it might seem at first. If the relevant sense of 
‘desirable’ is easy to miss, the question whether ϕing is a desirable option is easy 
to misunderstand. But the question whether I want to ϕ is not easy to 
misunderstand. Why suppose that we settle a question that is not easy to 
misunderstand in terms of a question that is?  
 
21 Byrne assumes the Williamsonian thesis that one’s evidence is one’s knowledge (TSK, p. 2) and 
that one can know that one knows that p by following the rule ‘If p, believe that you know that p’ 
(TSK, p. 116). But these assumptions explain, at most, how one knows that the proposition that p 
forms part of one’s evidence. They don’t explain how one knows that a certain belief is (not) 




DIS has a distinctive Rylean flavor. The suggestion is that finding out 
whether one feels disgust at something involves attending to sensational and 
behavioural cues produced by that thing (e.g. feelings of queasiness and 
distinctive facial expressions). But one obvious problem is that the disgust 
reactions mentioned in the antecedent of DIS might be produced by x in the 
wrong way. For example, suppose I am told that a disgusting object contained in 
a sealed box is producing disgust reactions in me via some electrodes placed in 
my brain. In such a situation, I may recognize that the object is disgusting and is 
producing disgust reactions in me – yet it would be false to say that I feel disgust 
at the object. Of course, the point is not that the situation just described is an 
ordinary one – it isn’t. The point is that, presumably, even if in the situation just 
described, I would retain privileged access to whether I feel disgust at the object 
in the box. Consequently, that access cannot be satisfactorily explained by DIS.   
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